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Abstract 
An operational method is presented for deriving a linear ranking of alternatives from 
repeated paired comparisons of the alternatives. Intransitivities in the observed preferences 
are cleared away by the introduction of decision errors of varying importance. An observed 
preference between two alternatives that causes an intransitivity in the course of the 
procedure will be reversed if it is of lesser importance. The method is applicable in case 
one wants to take account of intensities of preference and assume these to be monotone 
with the probability that an observed choice coincides with a fixed underlying true choice. 
Keywords: Intransitivities; Paired comparisons; Linear rankings 
1. Purpose and motivation 
Transitivity is a fundamental, if not the most fundamental, notion in decision 
theory. It is almost universally assumed in disciplines of decision theory and 
generally accepted as a principle of rationality. Yet, it is often violated in actual 
choice, particularly in pairwise choices. A first task for decision science is thus the 
resolution of intransitivities. This is the subject of the present paper. We shall 
present an algorithm for solving intransitivities in repeated choices. 
In many practical decision problems a set of options is given at the outset and it 
is required that one single option finally emerges from the decision process as 'the 
best'. Here,  the decision process may be of various kinds but we only consider 
pairwise choices. As, in general, any option may be embedded in an (intransitive) 
cycle of pairwise preferences, the requirement of one single option emerging as 
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'the best' asks for a decision process in which such cycles are broken and 
transformed into linear orders. 
The method we present was developed in the framework of a medical decision 
analysis in which treatments for patients of laryngeal cancer (Maas and Stalpers, 
1992) had to be determined. To be maximally useful for practical applications, we 
based our method on two intuitive assumptions: 
(i) More intense preferences are more trustworthy. 
(ii) Preferences that are invariant over replications are to be preserved. 
These assumptions erve to get our method to be transparent, ractable in its 
details, and mathematically simple. 
2. Introduction 
In the method of paired comparisons, pairs from a set Z = {x, y, z , . . .}  of 
n >/3 objects are presented to one judge. The method is very popular in the social 
sciences and is used primarily when the objects to be compared cannot be 
measured in a physically meaningful way. In practical applications ties are often 
not permitted, that is, each judgment consists of a choice or strict preference (in 
some sense) for one of the two compared objects. Let us consider the simple case 
of three objects x, y, and z to be judged once by one person, so that there are 
three pairs to be compared: {x, y}, {y, z} and {x, z}. Let > denote a binary 
preference relation on Z, where x > y means that x is strictly preferred to y, i.e. x 
(and not y) is chosen from {x, y}. As each comparison has two possible 
outcomes, this yields eight possible experimental results. In six of these results 
one object is chosen twice, a second object is chosen once, and the third object is 
not chosen at all. In the other two results each object is chosen once, that is, 
either[x > y, y > z, z > x] or [y > x, x > z, z > y] 
has been observed. Such results are called circular triads (Kendall and Smith, 
1940). Obtaining a linear order from such results is a problem that occurs in 
several fields. 
A circular triad may be regarded as an inconsistency of the judge, and several 
explanations for the occurrence of a circularity can be given (e.g. Tversky, 1969; 
David, 1988). It should be noted that circularities are not restricted to the case of 
three objects: m objects may give rise to a circular m-ad; we refer to any circular 
m-ad as an intransitivity (m t>3). However, while intransitivities may occur, 
researchers are often interested in establishing a transitive order. This may be the 
case if a prespecified model (e.g. unfolding, conjoint measurement) or a 
prescriptive application (e.g. in decision analysis) requires transitive data. One 
widely known procedure (Slater, 1961) consists of finding a linear order on the 
basis of the observations such that the number of preference reversals is as small 
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as possible; this number is known as Slater's i. Given intransitive data, all linear 
orders obtained from the data by exactly i preference reversals are called nearest 
adjoining orders. Algorithms for finding all nearest adjoining orders can be found 
in Remage and Thompson (1966) and Phillips (1969); an efficient algorithm for 
finding i and one nearest adjoining order for n< 10 objects is given by 
Bezembinder (1981). See also Goddard (1983), Ali et al. (1986), and Barth61emy 
(1990). 
Slater's procedure has been formulated for the case where one judgment is 
obtained for each of the (~) unordered pairs {x, y}, x ~y ,  that may be formed 
from the set Z of alternatives under scrutiny. Moon (1968) and, more recently, 
Delver et al. (1991), mention some other ranking methods for that case. 
However, in Moon's (1968, p. 42) judgment, none of the methods he considers is 
'entirely satisfactory' while none of the methods considered by Delver et al. 
satisfies all of the properties they deem desirable for these methods. 
We present a method that reckons with the extent o which a judge is stable in 
his/her preferences over repeated trials; this stability will henceforth be inter- 
preted as a measure of the intensity of preference. A natural starting point under 
replicated choices is the majority preference relation: x is majority preferred to y 
if x has been chosen from {x, y} in the majority of the presentations of {x, y}. 
Given an odd number of replications, preferences are thus dichotomized: x is 
strictly preferred to y, or y to x. Problems arise if the resulting majority 
preference relation turns out to be intransitive. Then, in applications, often an ad 
hoc nearest adjoining order is taken with respect to the majority preference 
relation. Yet, the dichotomization has led to a loss of information. Our method 
reckons with all the information of replicated choices. In this respect our method 
contrasts with dichotomization and all procedures uch as Slater's and the ones 
mentioned above in Moon (1968) and Delver et al. (1991), where all observed 
choices are implicitly assumed to be of equal importance; see Example 6.2 below. 
There also exists a large literature on the scaling of a set of objects from a set of 
pairwise relative choice frequencies (here interpreted as intensities of preferences) 
that may or may not violate transitivity of majority choice. Often a goal function 
is chosen that should be maximized. For a survey of related theories, and many 
sophisticated procedures, see Hubert (1976). 
This paper proposes a new method for solving intransitivities. Our method aims 
at being tractable and natural in practice, and will be tested as such in a computer 
simulation. Simplicity and appeal, rather than mathematical sophistication, are 
our primary aims. The method will not consist of maximizing a function. In 
contrast o Slater (1961), and most other methods such as the ones in Moon 
(1968) and Delver et al. (1991), our method can be applied to incomplete 
digraphs representing, for example, the ordinal information embedded in a 
conditional proximity matrix. We describe our method for the general case of 
incomplete digraphs, and given some examples and applications, such as to 
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Guttman's calogram model, and social choice theory. Incidentally, for the latter 
application a feature of our method is that the unanimity principle is satisfied. 
We consider stable preferences, i.e. preferences that remain the same through- 
out all replications, as particularly important. They contain all preferences of high 
reliability and intensity. Hence they will not be confounded with unstable 
preferences, which evidently cannot be highly reliable. Stable preferences can be 
confounded with unstable ones if a nearest adjoining order with respect to 
majority preferences i  chosen, or if a function is maximized. Cycles derived from 
stable preferences are more likely to represent genuine cycles than those derived 
from unstable preferences. Imposing a transitive order on a cycle of stable 
preferences may very well be inappropriate. Hence, in that case our method 
stops, and reconsideration of the data is recommended. Then, in particular, the 
data may be reconsidered in the light of decision models that allow genuine 
intransitivity such as Tversky (1969), Loomes and Sugden (1982), Bell (1982), 
and Fishburn and LaValle (1987). 
Section 5 shows that our method requires polynomial computation time. This 
reflects the simplicity and tractability mentioned above. About Slater's procedure, 
David (1988, p. 24) wrote that " . . .  the calculation of i (and a nearest adjoining 
order) continues to present a formidable challenge xcept when [the number of 
objects] is small". The methods presented in Remage and Thompson (1966) and 
Phillips (1969) require exponential computation time. Of course, tractability is 
especially important for dealing with many objects, and for the programming of 
the method. It does not allow for indifferences; inter alia, Singh and Thompson 
(1968) deal with indifferences. Our method preserves completeness, i.e. if the 
data satisfy completeness, then so does the solution. The method can be applied 
to incomplete preferences, and usually gives a unique transitive order. 
After the preliminaries in Section 3, the method is explained in detail in Section 
4. Section 5 shows that the computation time of the method is polynomial. 
Section 6 gives examples and Section 7 a Monte Carlo study. Section 8 contains 
the discussion. 
3. Preliminaries 
Let Z = {x, y, z . . . .  } be a nonempty set of n objects with x, y, z possibly 
subscripted. A binary relation R on Z is 
(i) asymmetric f xRy ~ not yRx, for all x, y E Z; 
(ii) transitive if xRy, yRz~xRz ,  for all x, y, z EZ ;  
(iii) complete if xRy or yRx, for all x ~y  E Z; 
(iv) acyclic if, for all m/> 1, [xlRx 2, x2Rx3, . . . , xm_lRxm] ~ [nOtxmRxl]. 
R is a linear order if it satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii), a tournament if it satisfies (i) 
and (iii) and a partial (or transitive) order if it satisfies (i) and (ii). Obviously, a 
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transitive tournament is a linear order. The transitive closure of R, denoted by R t, 
is defined by xRty if xRy or XRZlR . . .  RzmRY for some Z l , . . . ,  zm E Z. We let 
Z&Z denote the set of the unordered pairs {x, y}, x, y E Z, x ~y ,  that we plan to 
present o a subject in a particular experiment. Note that Z&Z may, but need 
not, equal the set of all unordered pairs that may be formed from Z. Note also 
that R is transitive if it satisfies (i), (iii), and (iv). 
Let --~ be an asymmetric binary relation on Z. D = (Z, ~)  is a directed graph, 
or digraph for short, with objects called nodes, and a relation between nodes is 
called an arc. We will frequently refer to an arc xy meaning an arc from x to y. A 
walk in a digraph is an alternating sequence of nodes and arcs, where the nodes 
before and after an arc are its beginning and endnodes, respectively. A path is a 
walk in which all nodes are distinct. A cycle is a walk with at least three nodes, 
where all nodes are distinct except the first and the last. A cycle containing m 
nodes is called an m-cycle. 
The indegree id(x) of a node x is the number of incoming arcs yx, the outdegree 
od(x) is the number of outgoing arcs xy. Obviously, the sum of in- and outdegree 
of a node never exceeds n - 1. 
A tournament T of n nodes contains N = (~) arcs, and may be used to 
represent all N pairwise preferences within a set of n objects. We call s--  
(od(1) , . . .  , od(n)) with od(1) 1>... /> od(n) the score vector of T, where od(l) is 
the outdegree of node I for l = 1 . . . .  , n. A tournament T is transitive if and only 
if s = (n - 1, n - 2 , . . . ,  1, 0); see Moon (1968, Theorem 9). 
An observed choice between two objects, made by a judge, can be called a 
manifest choice or manifest preference; usually we drop manifest, and simply 
write 'choice' or 'preference'. Hence, from now on, 'choice' and 'preference' 
without any specification will refer to manifest choice and manifest preference. 
We assume that for each {x, y} E Z&Z there exists a fixed true or latent choice, 
denoted by t(x, y), and that a manifest choice in {x, y}, denoted by m(x, y), 
reflects t(x, y) but may be distorted by error. A probabilistic assumption could be 
that re(x, y) coincides with t(x, y) with a fixed probability Zrxy > 1/2, and that 
errors on different choices are mutually independent; see Coombs et al. (1967). 
Since an observed choice does not necessarily coincide with its underlying true 
choice, paired comparisons are usually replicated a number of times. Accordingly, 
we assume throughout that each pair {x, y} E Z&Z is presented to the subject 
exactly k times, with k/> 1 odd; i.e. there have been k replications. Common 
values in experiments involving one judge are k = 3 and k = 5. We write xPjy if x 
is preferred to y in precisely k - j  replications, where P denotes the majority 
preference relation, i.e. xPy if xPy  for some j ~< (k - 1)/2. Because k is odd, x is 
majority preferred to y, or y to x, for every pair {x, y} presented to the judge. 
Of special interest are the stable choices, i.e. those paired comparisons in which 
the same choice is made in all replications. For instance, in an experiment on the 
seriousness of crimes, a judge generally will have no difficulty in choosing the 
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most serious crime from murder and driving through a red light. In other words, if 
x is murder, and y is driving through a red light, then ~rxy is very high and xPoY 
very likely. 
4. The construction of a transitive order 
Our method has been motivated by the following assumptions; comments are 
given below. 
Assumption 4.1. True preferences are acyclic. 
Assumption 4.2a. The more intense an observed preference is, the more likely it 
is to coincide with its corresponding true preference. 
Assumption 4.2b. Stable preferences have priority over unstable preferences. 
Assumption 4.1 requires no explanation. As regards Assumption 4.2a, under the 
probabilistic assumption described above it is plausible to interpret he intensity 
of a choice to be monotone with ~'xr and to consider a majority preference as 
more intense the larger k - ]  (the number of replications howing the majority 
choice in {x, y}) is. For Assumption 4.2b, think of choosing the most serious 
crime from murder and driving through a red light. Here, there will be no (or 
exceptionally small) random errors in preferences, and observed preferences will 
be stable. Obviously, stability of preferences does not preclude random errors. 
Instability of preferences, however, does ensure random errors. Hence, stable 
preferences should have special priority over unstable ones. Indeed, under the 
probabilistic assumption described above, for qTxy ~---0.6, 0.7, 0.8, the likelihood 
k ratio ~xy](1- "ffxy) k is, respectively, 3.4, 12.7, 64.0 for k=3,  and 7.6, 69.2, 
1024.0 for k = 5. These values support he priority of stable preferences but, of 
course, there is no certainty that a stable majority preference coincides with its 
corresponding true choice. 
As a consequence of Assumption 4.1, transitive closure will be applied after 
every step in the algorithm. As a consequence of Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2a, a 
preference will be overruled by the transitive closure of more intense preferences. 
As a consequence of Assumption 4.2b, stable preferences will never be reversed. 
If stable preferences contain cycles, we reckon with a genuine intransitivity. 
Rather than imposing transitivity, we then recommend reconsidering Assumption 
4.1 or the data. The possibility of revealing genuine intransitivities is in our 
opinion an advantage of binary choices over the direct ranking of the objects. 
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Practise shows that the direct ranking of objects is problematic, probably because 
this is more remote from everyday experience than binary choices. 
If stable preferences are acyclic, the method is applied. It constructs a sequence 
of transitive digraphs 
D O . . . .  ,D i . . . .  ,Dr,  f<~n(n-1) /2 ,  (4.1) 
with an increasing number of arcs. The final result D I gives the solution, i.e. a 
transitive relation. Under completeness (all pairs of objects have been presented 
to the judge) D I will be a tournament; hus the constructed transitive relation has 
preserved completeness. For Do, the starting digraph, we take the digraph 
corresponding to the transitive closure of the stable preferences. 
For the remainder of the procedure, see the flowchart in Fig. 1. A majority 
preference xPjy is called incorporated in D i if either the arc xy or the arc yx is 
present in Di. In the latter case (yx present) we say a preference reversal has 
occurred. Now suppose that some D i has been constructed. If all majority 
preferences have been incorporated in Di, the method stops. Therefore, suppose 
some majority preference has not yet been incorporated. The method then 
proceeds by selecting one of the most intense of these majority preferences, ay 
xPy,  inserting the arc xy, and extending by transitive closure. The particular 
choice from these most intense majority preferences i motivated by considera- 
tions of efficiency. Details are as follows. 
Take the minimal j such that a majority preference xP~y has not yet been 
incorporated. (Note that this integer j must be increased in comparison with the 
similar j* used in the construction of D~_ 1 only if all majority preferences Pj. 
have been incorporated in D~.) Determine the score vector s(Di)= 
(od(1) . . . . .  od( l ) , . . .  , od(n)), where nodes x l , . . . ,  x, have been reordered such 
that od(1)>~ --. ~>od(n). For the moment, the ranking of nodes with equal 
outdegrees i arbitrary (this arbitrariness will be dealt with below). An ordering 
based on outdegrees i  also used in Rubinstein (1980), Roberts (1990), and 
Delver et al. (1991). We will often refer to x~, the node corresponding to od(l), as 
1. Note that x~in s(D~) need not refer to the same node as x I in s (D i+ l )  , because 
the ordering of outdegrees depends on D~. Pairs of nodes are written with the 
highest outdegree first, and are subsequently ranked in a reversed lexicographic 
way, i.e. as (1,2), (1,3) . . . .  , (1, n), (2 ,3 ) , . . . ,  (2, n) . . . . .  (n -  1, n). In this 
order we choose the first pair (x, y) in which the Pfrelation has not yet been 
incorporated in D~. Note that the search for the pair xy can often be done faster; 
for instance, if id(l)+ od(l)= n -  1, node l can be ignored because, then, arcs 
with all other nodes are already present in D~. If xPjy, the arc xy is inserted; if 
yPjx, the arc yx is inserted. Note that inserting xy (or, similarly, yx), cannot 
create a cycle: the remainder of that cycle would constitute a path from y to x in 
Di, and, hence, by transitivity of D~, an arc yx. This cannot be. Hence transitive 
closure can be applied, resulting in the digraph D~+ 1. 
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no 
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i---0,j=0 I 
All xP.y ~ 
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in~? 
I 
Determine s(Di) 
Reorder nodes from 
highest to lowest 
outdegree 
I Reversed lexico- I
graphic ordering 
of pairs of nodes 
Select first pair of 
nodes x,y such that 
xP.y not incorpor- 
J ated in Di 
Add arc xy 
Apply transitive 
closure 
Di+l results 
iF 1-] 
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the method. 
After a finite number of steps the method stops, and all majority preferences 
have been incorporated. Note that the selected pair of nodes is always ordered in 
accordance with the majority preference. Reversals only occur through transitive 
closure, in agreement with the consequence of Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2a as 
described below those assumptions. As an example, if xPoy, yPo z, and ZPlX, then 
x---> z will result. 
Let us now deal with the arbitrariness of the ordering of outdegrees as 
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mentioned above. Suppose some nodes have an identical outdegree. Then these 
are ordered by increasing indegrees. Of course, in a computer program the score 
vector s(Di) can immediately be constructed in this way. Now there will be an 
unambiguous ordering of nodes in most cases, and x and y are selected. If there 
still does not exist an unambiguous ordering, the method may select one pair at 
random. Then possibly the solution is not unique, though often the solution will 
be not be affected by the particular choice of a pair. This completes the 
description of the method. 
Uniqueness can be further increased by a modification which has been used in 
the simulations. The price for this greater uniqueness i  that the computation time 
is nonpolynomial. Roberts (1990) emphasizes that uniqueness i a problem for 
many combinatorial optimization procedures. Let us now describe the modi- 
fication. All pairs of nodes that can be selected are considered. One of those pairs 
is selected and the solution is determined. Next another pair is selected, and again 
the solution is determined. This is done for all possible pairs. Finally, the solution 
with the minimal number of majority preference reversals i  chosen. If there are 
two or more such solutions, then no unique solution has been obtained. However, 
such occurrences are rare (see Section 7). Note that if od(1)> od(2)>od(3)= 
od(4) = od(5), then the ordering of x 3, x 4, and x 5 need not be determined 
immediately because the first selection may concern nodes 1 and 2. If by this 
selection 12 or 21 is incorporated, then this will usually affect the ordering of 
X3,X4~ and x 5. 
The procedure is greedy, i.e. it makes the best possible choice at each single 
step. This does not guarantee the finding of optimal solutions, but will usually 
lead to solutions close to optimal solutions. The solution is locally optimal in the 
sense of Assumption 4.2, i.e. reversals of arcs ('pairwise interchanges') will not 
improve the fulfillment of Assumption 4.2. 
Finally, in order to reduce calculations, it is convenient o partition the 
digraph representing the majority preferences (arc xy if and only if majority 
preference xPy) into 'strong components'. A digraph is strong if it contains a 
walk through all nodes with the same beginning and endnode. A subdigraph of 
a digraph D is a digraph whose nodes and arcs are nodes and arcs of D. A 
strong component D1 of a digraph D is a maximal strong subdigraph, i.e. there 
is no strong subdigraph D2(~D1) of D that contains all nodes and arcs of D 1. 
Obviously, cycles in majority preferences only occur within strong components 
of the digraph that represents the majority preference relation. Between strong 
components all majority preferences have the same direction, and the strong 
components can be ordered correspondingly. Hence it suffices to apply the 
method to each single strong component; next the solutions of all these 
separate strong components are embedded in one overall transitive solution in 
an obvious way. 
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5. Polynomial computation time 
As mentioned in the introduction, David (1988) qualifies the computation of all 
nearest adjoining orders as a 'formidable challenge'. The procedures of Remage 
and Thompson (1966) and Phillips (1969) require exponential computation time 
(see Phillips, 1969, p. 100). For many procedures it is not known whether or not 
they are NP (Even, 1979). Roberts (1990) expresses a strong suspicion that the 
'linear ordering problem' is NP. Our method will now be shown to require only 
polynomial computation time. If, as in our method, the number of operations to 
arrive at a solution varies, the order of the polynomial is to be determined for the 
case in which the number of operations is maximal. Below, for each step in the 
method as shown in Fig. 1, the highest number of operations required to move to 
the next step is determined. 
In the appendix it is shown that adding one arc to a transitive digraph, followed 
by transitive closure, requires a calculation time proportional to n2/4, i.e. is an 
n2-algorithm. Thus, the construction of D O (add one arc after the other, and apply 
transitive closure each time) is an na-algorithm. Let us now consider the extension 
of D i to Di+l, with symbols as in Section 4. Finding j, establishing s(Di), and 
selecting x and y are all n2-algorithms. Adding the arc between x and y plus 
transitive closure is, according to the appendix, an n2-algorithm. Hence the 
extension of Di to Di÷ ~ is an n2-algorithm. Such an extension of a digraph occurs 
at most n(n -1) /2  times (see formula (4.1)). Hence the method is an n 4- 
a lgor i thm, i.e. it is polynomial. Indeed, our method has been programmed in 
FORTRAN with a fixed number of n-dependent (nested) loops, with no 
transitions between loops. It is well known that this ensures a polynomial 
computation time (Garey and Johnson, 1979). 
6. Examples 
Example 6.1. Fig. 2(a) shows observed preferences which form the 4-cycle of 
majority preferences wPxPyPzPw; Slater's i is 1 (reverse zw). The relations P0 
and P1 are given in Fig. 2(b). D O can be created on the basis of P0, as shown in 
Fig. 2(c). Note that transitive closure does not result in any more arcs. Now, 
s(Do) = (2, 0, 0, 0), in which the first 0 is the outdegree corresponding to node w, 
because of its lowest indegree (id(w) = 0). The ordering of pairs to be selected is 
(x, w), (x, y), (x, z), (w, y), (w, z), (y, z), where it is noted that the ordering of 
(x, y), (x, z), and (w, y), (w, z) is arbitrary. It is easily verified that an arc between 
x and w is not yet present, so (w, x) is selected. The preference wPlx (see Fig. 
2(b)) is incorporated as the arc wx. On the basis of transitive closure, wy and wz 
are added, resulting in digraph D 1 (see Fig. 2(c)). Now the only Pl-preference not 
yet incorporated is yP~z; this is incorporated subsequently. Note that the 
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W X Z 
w__ 2 2 1 
x 1 3 3 
.Z.. 1 0 2 
z 2 0 1 
(a) 
y z y z 
(b) 
W ~X 
y z 
(c) 
Fig. 2. (a) Preference matrix of Example 6.1. The values of the cells represent the number of times 
the row object is preferred over the column object in three replications. The solution of our method is 
wxyz. This is a nearest adjoining order. (b) Preference relations P0 (left) and P~ (right). (c) Digraphs 
D o (left) and D~ (right). 
ambigui ty  in the order ing of y and z in s(Do) does not affect the uniqueness of  the 
solut ion.  A nearest  adjo in ing order  has been obtained.  One major i ty  preference 
zPw has been reversed into the arc wz. [] 
Example  6.2. Suppose we have observed all preferences between every pair  of 
four  objects  w, x, y and z in three repl ications. The result ing preference matr ix is 
given in Fig. 3. Note that the matr ix can be represented by a 4-cycle wPxPyPzPw.  
Slater 's  i is 1, and there is only one nearest  adjo in ing order ,  namely the one that 
can be created by reversing the major i ty  preference zPw,  hence constitut ing the 
l inear order  wxyz. However ,  appl ied to major i ty  preferences,  Slater 's  procedure  
does not  reckon with the intensit ies of the preferences,  i.e. all arcs are taken as 
equal  intensity. F rom a psychological  standpoint  his is debatable .  A f te r  all, the 
W X Z 
w 2 2 0 
x 1 3 3 
y 1 0 3 
z 3 0 0 
Fig. 3. Preference matrix of Example 6.2. The values of the cells represent the number of times the 
row object is preferred over the column object in three replications. The solution of our method is 
xyzw, involving two (unstable) preference reversals. The nearest adjoining order is wxyz, involving 
one (stable) preference r versal; Slater's i = 1. 
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judge has three times preferred z over w, i.e. the majority preference zPw is 
highly intense. If our method is applied, then it is easily seen that, because there 
is a path xyzw in Do, the linear order xyzw emerges from transitive closure. This 
implies that we reverse wPy and wPx. In both {w, x} and {w, y) the observed 
preferences are not the same in all replications. Hence the majority preferences in 
these pairs show more uncertainty than does the majority preference in {w, z). 
Our method thus reckons with intensities of preferences, and is appropriate if
priority is given to the higher reliability of more intense preferences. In this case 
the solution is a transitive tournament, but not a nearest adjoining order. 
Let us consider the above preferences according to the model of Tversky 
(1969). Suppose the objects have two dimensions, which are ordered apriori with 
respect to their importance, and a judge uses the following decision rule (see Fig. 
4). If the difference between two objects on the first dimension is strictly greater 
than 2e, choose the object with the higher value. If no decision based on 
dimension I can be made, choose the object with the higher value on dimension 
II, provided that the difference is strictly greater than e. If, according to this 
decision rule, no preference between objects can be stated, then choose at 
random. This rule yields the stable preferences zPow (based on dimension I), 
xPoz, xPoy and yPo z (based on dimension II), while in the pairs (w,x} and 
{w, y} a random choice is made. This decision rule could result in the preference 
matrix given in Fig. 3. In this case it would be undesirable to change the stable 
preferences. [] 
Example 6.3. The matrix in Fig. 5 results in majority preferences between 12 
objects enclosed in one single strong component. This strong component com- 
prises the cycle lPkPjPiPgPfPcPaPbPePdPhPl. Slater's i is 4. P0 contains no 
cycles, hence D O can be created and our method can be applied. In- and 
outdegrees of D o are given in Fig. 6. It is left to the reader to verify that, after 
application of our method, the linear order lkjihgefdcab results. This order is a 
nearest adjoining order (i.e. contains four preference reversals). The small digits 
in the cells of Fig. 5 indicate which edges have been directed in the same 'run' 
(i.e. resulting from a selection of nodes and subsequent transitive closure). 
This example has been taken from a medical study of ours in which patients are 
Dimensions 
I II 
w £ 4g 
x 2e 5e 
y 3~ 3e 
z 4~ 
Fig. 4. The description of the objects in Fig. 3, based on three dimensions; dimensions I and II are 
important for the decision rule. 
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a b c d e f g h i j k l oi 
a 21~ 0 
b - 1 
c 2 ~ - 
d 2 t  2 
e 1~ 2 
f 3 3 
g 21 3 
h 3 
i 212  
j 3 
k 3 
l 3 
ii 10 10 9 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
- 60  0 1 1 0 
1 0 2 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
2 5 525  0 1 2 
3 13  3 1 1 0 
2 1 3 2 2 4 -  0 
2 1 3 3 233  1 
3 3 1 3 3 
7 5 4 4 2 1 1 
I 
1 
2 
4 
4 
5 
6 
7 
7 
9 
10 
10 
Fig. 5. (Example 6.3: A preference matrix with 12 nodes, each cell represents he number of times the 
object in the row is preferred to the object in the column). A cell marked with x, where x is a number 
between 1 and 10, means that the edge representing this cell was directed in digraph Dx, either by 
adding an arc or due to transitive closure. The arc is directed from row object o column object. The 
preference reversals are underlined. 
to choose between two treatments for laryngeal cancer, namely radiotherapy and 
surgery. To help patients in choosing, they are given paired comparisons of 
possible outcomes of treatments in which one treatment has a higher life 
expectancy and a worse speech quality than the other. This finally leads to a 
preference for one of the two treatments (Maas and Stalpers, 1992). Our  
procedure can be used to establish a transitive order if, after three replications, 
intransit ivit ies are present. 
So far, paired comparisons have been presented to nine patients. One of them 
stopped cooperat ion after one replication. From the remaining eight patients, 
three were lexicographic and two more were completely transitive. Hence three 
patients were intransitive. Judging by a measure developed by Maas (1993), one 
of them was 'too'  intransitive. That is, the percentage of circular triads was higher 
than five. From one of the remaining two intransit ive patients, the above example 
has been taken. The other patient had seven objects comprised in a single strong 
component .  The solution based on our method requires four preference reversals, 
nodes a b c d e f g h i j" k l 
od(x) 0 0 1 1 2 4 6 3 8 7 9 10 
id(x) 10 7 7 7 5 5 4 3 1 2 0 0 
Fig. 6. Example 6.3: Out- and indegrees in Do, i.e. after transitive closure of the stable preferences. 
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yielding a nearest adjoining order. (For the corresponding preference matrix of 
this patient, see Maas and Stalpers, 1992.) [] 
Example 6.4. Suppose there are 101 objects {x~, . . .  ,Xl00, w}, and there are 
k = 11 repetitions. The preferences x i >xi÷ ~ are stable for all i >0 ,  j >0.  For 
i > 1, x iPsw , i.e. x~ is chosen over w six times, suggesting that w should be the 
least preferred object. However, suppose that wP4Xl,  w is preferred over x~ seven 
times; this suggests that w should be the most preferred object. Our algorithm 
first establishes the transitive ordering x 1 ~. . .~x~00,  and next incorporates 
w >x 1. By transitive closure, the final ordering is w >x I > . - .  >xl00. 
Discussion.  The example clearly illustrates that our method assigns priority to 
intenser preferences, irrespective of the number of less-intense preferences that 
must be reversed subsequently. In this example, the outcome of our method 
seems questionable, and the final ordering x l> . . .>x~00>w seems more 
plausible. 
A more sophisticated variation of our method could be developed to provide a 
more plausible ordering. Then at each stage a new preference to be incorporated 
would not necessarily be the most intense preference, but would rather be 
determined in some sense by the number of less-intense preferences that might be 
reversed by incorporating the preference and transitive closure. However, such a 
method would be much more cumbersome, and would require subjective choices 
concerning tradeoffs between numbers of preference reversals and intensities of 
preferences. This would necessarily introduce some subjective interpretation of 
the importance of reversals and intensities. We have developed our method to be 
tractable and transparent, at the price of giving nonoptimal results in some 
extreme cases. Note that the above example is not natural, and that similar 
phenomena will occur only rarely. [] 
Our method can be applied to social choice, where there are k individuals and 
each individual expresses a preference, leading again to k observed preferences 
for each pair of objects. The ordering to be constructed is now interpreted as a 
group preference relation. A feature of our method is that it ensures the 
unanimity principle, i.e. if all persons agree on a preference between two objects, 
then so will the group preference. Our method is, however, not strategy-proof, 
i.e. it may be in a subject's interest o represent his or her preference incorrectly. 
This is illustrated in the following example. 
Example 6.5 (strategic behavior in a social choice). Suppose, as in Example 6.4, 
that there are 101 objects {x 1 . . . . .  Xx0o, w}. There are k = 11 persons, and the 
preferences x i ~x i+ i are unanimous (i.e. stable) for all i>0 ,  j>0 .  The first 
person has a transitive preference relation x 1 > w ~ x 2 ~ • • • > Xl00. Suppose that 
wPsx l ,x iPsw for i=  2 . . . . .  99, and XlooP4w. Our algorithm first establishes 
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x 1 > x 2 > • • • > Xloo, then incorporates X10 0 > W; by transitive closure, xl > X 2 ~> " " " ~ 
Xl0 o > W finally results. If the first person were to know this, then he or she might 
prefer revealing the preferences w >Xx >x 2 > • • • >Xlo o. In that case, again our 
algorithm first establishes x~ >x 2 >. . ->Xmo;  in the next step, either wP4x ~ or 
XlooP4w is to be incorporated, and because x1 has a higher outdegree than Xloo, 
the preference w >x I is incorporated. By transitive closure, w >x~ >x 2 > • • • > 
xlo o results, which person 1 may well prefer over the ordering x I >x  2 >. . ->  
Xxoo>W. It is then to person l 's advantage to misrepresent his/her true 
preferences. [] 
7. Monte Carlo study 
We assume that the true latent preferences are represented by a real function f, 
i.e. x is preferred to y if and only if f(x) >f (y ) .  Manifest choices, denoted by >,  
are probabilistic in accordance with Luce's (1959) model, i.e. 
f (x)  
 r(x >y)  - f (x)  + f (y )  ' 
where ~-(x > y) is the probability of choosing x over y in a single choice. Scale 
values f (x) ,  f (y )  are chosen such that for all x, y with consecutive scale values the 
probabilities ~-(x >y)  are equal. Hence, for objects x, y , z  . . . .  , v, w (with 
decreasing scale values), the following equations need to be solved: 
f (x)  f (y )  f (v)  
. . . .  (7.1) 
( f (x )  + f (y ) )  ( f (y )  + f (z))  f (v)  + f (w)  " 
Without loss of generality, f(x), being the highest scale value, can be fixed at 1.0. 
The lowest scale value, f (w) ,  is fixed at 0.001 (not at 0, because 7r(x > w) = 1.0 is 
not allowed in Luce's model). Now, (7.1) becomes 
1 f(y) f(v) 
(1 + f (y ) )  f (y )  + f (z )  - f (v)  + .001 " (7.2) 
With n objects, the solution of (7.2) is f (y )=[ f (w) ]  1/("-1), and f(z) = 
[f(y)]2 . . . .  , f (v)  = [f (y)]" - : .  
The results of the Monte Carlo study are given in Table 1. It is obvious that, 
especially for low values of n, our method almost always produces a nearest 
adjoining order. This is partially due to the fact that probabilities are rather high. 
The proportion of nearest adjoining orders gradually decreases with increasing n, 
and is around 0.50 when n = 15. Proportions do not vary much over 3 and 5 
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Table 1 
Results of the Monte Carlo study with Luce's choice model 
n k Proportion Interval ~ Cyclic Not unique 
5 3 0.971 0.85-1.0 0 0 
7 3 1.0 0.93-1.0 0 0 
7 5 1.0 0.90-1.0 0 0 
9 3 0.893 0.82-0.94 0.016 0 
9 5 0.938 0.86-0.97 0.004 0 
11 3 0.818 0.76-0.87 0.015 0.005 
11 5 0.811 0.73-0.87 0 0 
13 3 0.606 0.51-0.69 0.033 0.008 
13 5 0.614 0.52-0.70 0.008 0 
15 3 0.501 0.40-0.60 0.101 0 
15 5 0.462 0.36-0.56 0.010 0 
Notes: n = number of objects, k = number of replications, proportion =proportion earest adjoining 
orders resulting from solution; Interval ~ = 5% confidence interval for proportions of previous column; 
Cyclic = proportion of digraphs howing cyclic stable preferences; and Not unique = the proportion of 
matrices in which no unique solution could be determined. 
a For this interval the usual formula p-+ 1.96X/p(p- 1)/n is used. 
replications. The number of  cyclic P0 is low; the number  of digraphs with 
nonunique solutions with an equal number  of  preference reversals is very low. 
8. Discussion 
It has been shown that the method presented gives a solution that often is 
unique, and often coincides with a nearest adjoining order, especially for n < 10. 
The Monte Carlo study supports the method. It will be of use in practice if 
researchers and/or  judges adhere to a formal decision, or want to prepare data, in 
the context of a prespecified model that assumes transitivity. In contrast to the 
algorithms for finding all nearest adjoining orders of  Remage and Thompson 
(1966) and Phillips (1969), our method is polynomial and therefore suitable for 
large numbers of objects. In practice the method is straightforward and can be 
done by hand, even with 15 objects. It has not been our aim to arrive at nearest 
adjoining orders because, as shown in Example 6.2, a nearest adjoining order 
need not be a proper solution if intensities of preferences are relevant. 
As we have seen, the number  of arc reversals in one empirical case (Example 
6.3) coincides with Slater's i. For other methods such an example, consisting of a 
strong component  with 12 nodes, is complex We have collected more real data as 
in Example 6.3, and until now our method always produced a nearest adjoining 
order. The method fairly often gives one solution established in a few minutes 
without a computer.  
The requirement of replications can be modified by asking respondents to 
directly state intensities of  preferences on a, say, 3- or 5-point scale. The 
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applicability of the method to social choice was described in Example 6.5 and the 
text above. 
If high numbers of replications are involved, then the method can be modified. 
It can then be made more tractable by collapsing the Pfrelations. For example, 
let P~ := P0, let P~ be the union of P1 . . . .  , Pkl, P~ the union of Pkl÷~, • • •, Pk2, 
etc. Another possibility is to enlarge the class of preferences to be treated as the 
stable preferences in our method. For instance, if the relative choice frequency 
for a particular choice significantly exceeds randomness (Coombs et al., 1967), 
then this may be treated as a stable choice. The remaining choices are then 
treated as the unstable preferences in Section 4. 
All examples and applications given so far concerned tournaments. We give two 
examples of incomplete preference structures to which our method can be 
applied. 
Example A. If we collect dominances of similarities between pairs {x, y}, with x 
fixed, y ~x ,  then these could be interpreted as meaning that if {x, y} > {x, z}, 
then x and y are judged to be more similar than x and z. With n nodes, there are 
M = (n~l)  such paired comparisons with fixed x. These M comparisons form a 
tournament Tx. We similarly obtain Ty, Tz , . . . ,  yielding n tournaments al- 
together. Such dominances of similarities are typically derived from a 'conditional 
proximity matrix', or result directly from 'conjoint paired comparisons' (Bezem- 
binder, 1991). Such data may easily show cycles, in particular between tourna- 
ments. For instance, it is possible that {y,x}-- -~{x,z} within Tx and 
{x, z}---~ {z, y} within Tz, but {z, y}---~ {y, x} within Ty. As for distinct x, y, z, w, 
no arc between {x, y} and {z, w} is given in the data, methods for solving 
intransitivities are called for that, like our method, do not require completeness in 
the data. 
Example B. Complete bipartite digraphs. These are denoted by D(V1, Vz), in 
which V 1 and V 2 are disjoint sets of objects such that there is an arc connecting 
every node of V 1 with every node of V2, while there are no other arcs. An 
example is Guttman's (1944) scalogram with n subjects and m items, which can 
be represented by such a structure. Here our method can also be applied. 
Relations between odes of the same set should then not be inserted as a result of 
transitive closure. 
The main motivation for developing our method has been to provide a solution 
that is widely applicable because: 
• It is easily obtained in little (polynomial) time, can easily be programmed, and 
can even be calculated by hand for numbers of objects that are not too large. 
• It has a transparent psychological basis because it reckons with stability/ 
intensity of preference, and avoids the confounding of stable preferences with 
the, evidently unreliable, unstable preferences. 
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Appendix: The maximum number of directed arcs resulting from transitive 
closure 
Say D is a transit ive digraph with n nodes. An  arc between x and y is not  yet 
present  in D, and the arc xy is to be added.  Let  A be the set containing x and all 
nodes from which an arc goes to x. Let  B be the set containing y and all nodes b 
such that an arc goes from y to b. A and B are dis joint because yzx  for z E A fq B 
together  with [not yx] would violate transit ivity of D. Say A contains s nodes,  B 
contains t nodes. Transit ive closure will generate at most st-1 new arcs, i .e. all 
nodes f rom A to B except xy. This is maximal  for s = t = n/2.  So all together,  at 
most  n2/4 arcs are added.  
References 
I. Ali, W.D. Cook and M. Kress, On the minimum violations ranking of a tournament, Manage. Sci. 
32 (1986) 660-672. 
J.-P. Barthrlemy, Intransitivities of preferences, lexicographic shifts and the transitive dimension of 
oriented graphs, Brit. J. Math. Star. Psychol. 43 (1990) 29-37. 
D.E. Bell, Regret in decision making under uncertainty, Oper. Res. 30 (1982) 961-981. 
Th. Bezembinder, Circularity and consistency in paired comparisons, Brit. J. Math. Stat. Psychol. 34 
(1981) 16-37. 
Th. Bezembinder, Circularity in conjoint paired comparisons, in: J.-C. Falmagne and J.P. Doignon, 
eds, Mathematical Psychology: Current Developments (Springer, Berlin, 1991) pp. 157-180. 
C.H. Coombs, Th. Bezembinder and F.M. Goode, Testing expectation theories of decision making 
without measuring utility or subjective probability, J. Math. Psych. 4 (1967) 72-103. 
H.A. David, The Method of Paired Comparisons, 2nd edn. (Griffin, London, 1988). 
R. Delver, H. Monsuur and A.J.A. Storcken, Ordering pairwise comparison structures, Theory and 
Decision 31 (1991) 75-94. 
S. Even, Graph Algorithms (Pitman, London, 1979). 
P.C. Fishburn and I.H. LaValle, A nonlinear, nontransitive and additive-probability model for 
decisions under uncertainty, Ann. Stat. 15 (1987) 830-844. 
M.R. Garey and D.S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP- 
Completeness (Freeman, San Francisco, 1979). 
S.T. Goddard, Ranking tournaments and group decisionmaking, Manage. Sci. 29 (1983) 1384-1392. 
L. Guttman, A basis for scaling qualitative data, Amer. Sociological Rev. 9 (1944) 139-150. 
L. Hubert, Seriation using asymmetric proximity measures, Brit. J. Math. Stat. Psychol. 29 (1976) 
32-52. 
M.G. Kendall and B.B. Smith, On the method of paired comparisons, Biometrika 31 (1940) 324-345. 
A. Mass et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 29 (1995) 83-101 101 
G. Loomes and R. Sugden, Regret heory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty, 
Econom. J. 92 (1982) 805-824. 
R.D. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior (Wiley, New York, 1959). 
A. Maas, A Relativized Measure of Circularity, Math. Soc. Sci. 26 (1993) 79-91. 
A. Maas and L.J.A. Stalpers, Assessing utilities by means of additive conjoint measurement: An 
application in medical decision analysis, Medical Decision Making 12 (1992) 288-297. 
J.W. Moon, Topics on Tournaments (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1968). 
J.P.N. Phillips, A further procedure for determining Slater's i and all nearest adjoining orders, Brit. J. 
Math. Stat. Psychol. 22 (1969) 97-101. 
R. Remage, Jr. and W.A. Thompson, Jr., Maximum-likelihood paired comparison rankings, 
Biometrika 53 (1966) 143-149. 
J.M. Roberts, Jr., Modeling hierarchy: Transitivity and the linear ordering problem, J. Math. Sociol. 
16 (1990) 77-87. 
A. Rubinstein, Ranking the participants in a tournament, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 38 (1980) 108-111. 
J. Singh and W.A. Thompson, Jr., A treatment of ties in paired comparisons, Ann. Math. Stat. 39 
(1968) 2002-2015. 
P. Slater, Inconsistencies in a schedule of paired comparisons, Biometrika 48 (1961) 303-312. 
A. Tversky, Intransitivity of preferences, Psychol. Rev. 76 (1969) 31-48. 
